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Abstract 
Seemingly precognitive (prophetic) dreams may be a result of one’s unconscious processing 
of environmental cues and having an implicit inference based on these cues manifest itself in 
one’s dreams. We present two studies exploring this implicit processing hypothesis of 
precognitive dream experience. Study 1 investigated the relationship between implicit 
learning, transliminality, and precognitive dream belief and experience. Participants 
completed the Serial Reaction Time task and several questionnaires. We predicted a positive 
relationship between the variables. This prediction was not supported. Study 2 tested the 
hypothesis that differences in the ability to notice subtle cues explicitly might account for 
precognitive dream beliefs and experiences. Participants completed a modified version of the 
flicker paradigm. We predicted a negative relationship between the ability to explicitly detect 
changes and precognitive dream variables. This relationship was not found. There was also no 
relationship between precognitive dream belief and experience and implicit change detection. 
 
Keywords: precognitive dream; implicit learning; change blindness; individual differences; 
paranormal belief; transliminality. 
 
1. Introduction 
Precognition, the putative reception of future-related information that could not have 
possibly been obtained by any known means (e.g., rational inference, coincidence), is one of 
the most widely believed paranormal phenomena. Surveys of large samples of individuals 
show that around one third of the population believe in the ability to foretell the future 
(Moore, 2005) or have experienced at least one precognitive dream (Haraldsson, 1985; 
Palmer, 1979). This paper explores potential psychological factors contributing to 
precognitive dream belief and experience. 
Beside the hypothesis that precognitive dreams are a genuine phenomenon amenable to 
scientific testing (Krippner, Ullman, & Honorton, 1971; Sherwood & Roe, 2003), there have 
also been proposed several alternative hypotheses to explain this and similar experiences, 
such as individual differences in probabilistic reasoning and affirmative bias (Blagrove, 
French, & Jones, 2006), false memories (Wilson & French, 2006), or attribution of meaning 
to coincidence (Houran & Lange, 1998). One such, as of yet unexplored, hypothesis proposes 
that precognitive dreams might be a result of inferences during sleep based on subtle cues 
from the environment perceived outside of awareness. This hypothesis was first proposed by 
Aristotle over 2000 years ago in his treatise On Prophesying by Dreams, and was more 
recently voiced by James Alcock (1981). To illustrate, a fulfilled nightmare about the death 
of an elderly relative might be caused by perceiving, without awareness, a slight change in 
their appearance, behaviour or physiology (e.g., heavier breathing, paler complexion) during 
a previous encounter. These subtle, yet disconcerting indications of ill health might create a 
seemingly precognitive dream about the death of the person in question. If this person then 
passes away, the dream is recalled and the attribution of precognition is made. 
The plausibility of the implicit processing hypothesis (IPH) of precognitive dream 
experiences appears to be supported by research into sleep and dreaming. There exists 
extensive literature supporting the notion that dreams reflect, to some extent, waking life 
experiences (e.g., Schredl & Hofmann, 2003; Fosse, Fosse, Hobson, Stickgold. 2003; Pesant 
& Zadra, 2006; Hobson, & Schredl, 2011, for discussion). In light of this research, there 
appears to be no reason why information acquired in waking like could not, in principle, 
manifest itself in dream imagery. 
Moreover, the prevailing expert opinion seems to agree with the claim that sleep and 
dreaming can facilitate processes such as memory consolidation or learning and inspire 
insight (Walker & Stickgold, 2006), although there are also opposing views on the matter 
(Vertes, Eastman, 2000; Frank & Benington, 2006). Previous research in this area has found 
support for the role of REM sleep in consolidation of memory and learning (Ellenbogen, 
Payne, & Stickgold, 2006; Stickgold & Walker, 2007; Wamsley, Tucker, Payne, Benavides, 
& Stickgold, 2010), including probabilistic and procedural learning (Walker, Brakefield, 
Morgan, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2002; Djonlagic, et al., 2009). There is also some evidence 
that sleep causes improved performance on tasks requiring insight into hidden rules (Wagner, 
Gais, Haider, Verleger, & Born, 2004) and primes associative networks (Cai, Mednick, 
Harrison, Kanady, & Mednick, 2009). 
Here we present two studies testing the IPH. Study 1 explores the relationship between 
implicit learning and precognitive dream experiences while Study 2 focuses on perception 
without awareness and its relationship to these experiences. Both studies were approved by 
the Psychology Department's ethics panel. 
2. Study 1 
One prediction of the implicit processing hypothesis is that people who tend to have these 
experiences are better able to pick up on such subtle cues and process them without being 
aware of it. This can be tested in the frame of the implicit learning paradigm. Implicit 
learning occurs when people acquire new information without intending it or being 
consciously aware of having done so (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Kaufman, et 
al. 2010). Several methods for exploring implicit learning have been developed but one in 
particular, the Serial Reaction Time task, seems to be the most appropriate and most widely 
used (Jiménez & Vázquez, 2005). Moreover, this method has recently been used in individual 
differences research, where implicit learning significantly correlated with the personality 
factors of intuition, Openness to Experience, and impulsivity, as well as with cognitive 
variables including verbal analogical reasoning, processing speed, and academic performance 
(Kaufman, et al., 2010) . This individual differences approach regards implicit learning as an 
ability and is in line with our hypothesis. 
Of potential interest in exploring the relationship between implicit processing and 
precognitive dream experience is the concept of transliminality, developed by Thalbourne 
and Delin (1994) and defined as “a largely involuntary susceptibility to, and awareness of, 
large volumes of inwardly generated psychological phenomena of an ideational and affective 
kind” (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994, p25). Crawley, French, and Yesson (2001) found a link 
between transliminality and susceptibility to subliminal priming. Participants in this study 
were led to believe they were taking part in an extra-sensory perception card-guessing task. 
Unbeknownst to them, half of the trials were preceded by a subliminal prime showing the 
correct response. The results showed that transliminality was positively related to number of 
correct responses only on the primed trials. Furthermore, in a subsequent task, high 
transliminality subjects were more successful at detecting which trials had been primed, even 
though they reported no conscious awareness of the priming in the card-guessing task. These 
findings suggest that transliminality might play a role in the kind of implicit processing 
required by the IPH. If high levels of transliminality are conducive to being able to detect 
subtle environmental cues (e.g., subliminal primes used in the above-mentioned study) 
without being aware of them, then people who experience precognitive dreams should, under 
the IPH, score high on transliminality. Similarly people who possess higher levels of this trait 
should show superior implicit learning ability compared to low transliminality individuals. 
Study 1 therefore predicts that precognitive dream experience will positively correlate with 
transliminality and implicit learning. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
A planned number of participants (N = 50, 31 females), mostly undergraduate students, 
were recruited and paid for their participation. Data from one participant were excluded due 
to incompleteness and another participant was recruited in order to preserve the planned 
number of participants. Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 53 years (mean = 21.98, SD = 
17.49). 
 
2.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
Serial Reaction Time. To assess individual differences in implicit learning, we used a 
modified version of the widely-used Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task (Nissen & Bullemer, 
1987) used by Kaufman, et al. (2010). During a trial, an ‘X’ appeared in one of four possible 
locations represented by underscores and arranged horizontally in the centre of the screen. 
The keys ‘z’, ‘x’, ‘n’, and ‘m’ were assigned one to each location (‘z’ to the leftmost, ‘m’ to 
the rightmost). The task was to press the appropriate key as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The next stimulus appeared on one of the positions 500 ms after a key was pressed. 
Reaction time was measured from the onset of the stimulus. If no response was recorded, the 
next stimulus appeared after five seconds. The sequence of locations was governed by two 
second order conditional (SOC) sequences, where an element is determined by a combination 
of two previous elements; the Probable sequence (1–2–1–4–3–2–4–1–3–4–2–3) occurred on 
85% of the trials, and the Improbable sequence (3–2–3–4–1–2–4–3–1–4–2–1) occurred on 
15%. Note that no individual triplet appears in both sequences. The task consisted of seven 
blocks of trials with 102 trials per block. Because SOC requires two pre-existing trials, the 
first two trials were selected at random and excluded from the analysis. The first block served 
as a practice block and was not analysed either. The occurrence of Probable and Improbable 
trials was randomised. The task was designed using E-prime version 2.0 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) in white on black background. The design of 
the SRT task is summarised in Fig. 1. 
 
[INSERT  FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Precognitive Dream Belief and experience. Belief in precognitive dreams was assessed 
using a 6-item scale created for the present study. Response options on the 5-point Likert 
scale ranged from 1 (‘Completely disagree’) to 5 (‘Completely agree’). The overall 
reliability1 of this scale reached the acceptable level (ωt = .75; 95% CI [.58, .86]) but the 
analysis revealed one very weakly and one negatively correlated item, which we omitted 
from further analysis, raising the reliability index of the scale to ωt = .88; 95% CI [.79, .93]. 
One further question that related to precognitive dream frequency (“Approximately how 
often you have had a precognitive dream over the last few years?”) was included in the 
battery with response options: “Never”, “Less than once a year”, “About once a year”, 
                                                
1 We chose McDonald's  ωt over the traditionally used Cronbach’s α as an index of psychometric reliability 
because of the many problems associated with the latter (see e.g., Dunn, Baguley, & Brundsen, 2013). 
McDonald's  ωt provides a superior measure of reliability and, unlike α, does not rely on the often broken 
assumption of essential tau-equivalence (Dunn, Baguley, & Brundsen, 2013; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 
2005). 
“About once in six months”, “About once a month”, and “About once a week”. This item was 
used to divide participants into those with and without experience of precognitive dreams. 
Transliminality. In order to measure participants’ transliminality, we used the Revised 
Transliminality Scale (RTS; Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, & Storm, 2000), a 17-item forced 
choice scale. The scale is presented in an earlier 29-item form (Thalbourne, 1998) in order to 
preserve the context but only the 17 items of interest are scored. Houran, Thalbourne, and 
Lange (2003) report the scale’s high internal consistency (KR-20 r = .85) and test-retest 
reliability over an average of fifty days, r = .82, p < .001, N = 51. In the present sample, the 
reliability of the full scale was comparably high (ωt = .85; 95% CI [.75, .9]), while the 
reliability of the 17 items was moderate to high (ωt = .77; 95% CI [.64, .85]). This, however, 
is not necessarily a problem given that the RTS was validated using Rasch model and 
therefore its reliability should be independent of the sample (Hambleton, 1991).  
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
The study took place in the Psychology Department of the University of Edinburgh. 
Participants were shown individually into an experimental cubicle where they were seated in 
front of a computer with standard 16-inch CRT monitor with 75 Hz refresh rate. They were 
given an information sheet and a consent form. Next, demographic data were collected and 
participants were asked to complete the SRT task which was described as a reaction time task 
without a mention of implicit learning or the probabilistic SOC nature of the stimuli. 
Participants were encouraged to get comfortable pressing the assigned keys and then asked to 
proceed when they were ready by pressing the space bar. Once participants completed 102 
trials, the block ended and they were asked to take a break. After a minute they were asked to 
continue, when ready, by pressing the space bar again and the next block of trials ensued in 
the same fashion. Once the SRT task was over, subjects were asked to complete the 
questionnaire part of the study. The battery of items was presented in electronic form using 
the Google forms service. Upon completion, subjects were thanked for their participation, 
debriefed about the actual nature of the SRT task, paid, and dismissed. 
 
2.1.4. Hypotheses and analysis 
Based on the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience, we 
predicted the following: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the performance on the SRT task and 
precognitive dream belief. 
H2: Performance on the SRT task is positively related to transliminality score. 
H3: Transliminality is positively related to precognitive dream belief. 
H4: Participants with prior precognitive dream experience will perform better at the SRT 
task than those who have not had such experience. 
H5: Participants with prior precognitive dream experience will score higher on 
transliminality than participants without such experience. 
To assess the individual differences in implicit learning, the SRT task was analysed using 
a mean difference score. To arrive at this score, we first deleted all error responses (5.08% of 
all trials). Next, we calculated a 20% trimmed mean reaction time (RT) for each block (2-7) 
per participant, separately for Probable and Improbable trials. Subsequently, we calculated 
the difference between the trimmed mean RT of Improbable trials and the trimmed mean RT 
of Probable trials in each block for each participant. The mean of the resulting six numbers 
was the participant’s mean difference score (MDS). For readers who may prefer a more 
formal notation, 
( )
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2
%20%20∑
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Χ−Χ
= j
RTprobRTimprob
i
ijij
MDS , 
where i is any given participant and j represents block. We chose the 20% trimmed mean 
over mean because it provides a more reliable estimator of location for non-normally 
distributed data (Wilcox, 2010). Higher MDS represents greater implicit learning on the SRT 
task. 
The Revised Transliminality Scale was analysed using the Rasch score derived according 
to Lange, et al. (2000). 
Unless stated otherwise, all reported p-values are two-tailed and all confidence intervals 
(CIs) were computed based on a bootstrap sample of N = 2000. 
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. SRT task validation 
First, we analysed the overall data from the SRT task in order to validate the implicit 
learning effect. Fig. 2 shows the pooled performance by trial type across blocks. 
A repeated measures factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with block (6 
levels) and sequence (2 levels; probable v improbable) as within-subjects factors and 20% 
trimmed mean RT calculated per block per trial type for each participant as dependent 
variable. The results showed a significant effect of type of trial, F(1,49) = 37.95, p < .001,  !!  
= .45, and block, F(3.51,172.1)2 = 2.54, p  = .049,  !!  = .05. There was also a significant 
interaction between trial type and block, F(5,245) = 3.78, p = .003,  !!  = .07. These results, 
combined with examination of Fig. 2, indicate that learning did indeed take place and that the 
greatest differences appeared later in the task. 
 
[INSERT FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics for the analysed variables for the overall data 
as well as separately for the two compared groups. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.2.2. Hypothesis testing 
In order to assess the relationships predicted by H1 and H2, we conducted a series of 
simple regression analyses with MDS as outcome variable and precognitive dream belief and 
transliminality respectively as predictors. Precognitive dream belief was not a significant 
predictor of performance on the SRT task (β = 0.14, t(48) = 1.00, p = .322, R2 = .02, F(1,48) 
= 1.00, p = .322). Transliminality scores also did not significantly predict participants’ 
performance on the implicit learning task (β = -0.21, t(48) = -1.48, p = .146, R2 = .04, F(1,48) 
= 2.18, p = .146). These results did not support hypothesis H1 about positive relationship 
                                                
2 Greenhouse-Geisser (    = .702) corrected degrees of freedom due to significant Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
(W = 0.357, χ2(14) = 48.502). 
between performance on the SRT task and precognitive dream belief, or hypothesis H2 about 
the relationship between SRT performance and transliminality. 
We also conducted a simple regression to explore the role of transliminality in 
precognitive dream belief (H3). Transliminality was a significant predictor of precognitive 
dream belief, b = 0.51, 95% CI [0.15, 0.83], p = .002. Transliminality accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in precognitive dream belief, R2 = .19, F(1,48) = 10.95, p 
= .002, thus supporting the hypothesis H3 of a positive relationship between transliminality 
and precognitive dream belief. 
Given this relationship between precognitive dream belief and transliminality, we 
investigated the unique contribution of transliminality to SRT performance. In order to do 
this, we conducted a simultaneous multiple regression analysis with MDS as outcome 
variable and precognitive dream belief and transliminality as predictors, thus controlling for 
precognitive dream belief. As shown in Table 2, transliminality was a significant predictor of 
performance on the SRT task, p = .035. However, the direction of the relationship was 
opposite to the one predicted by H2. We also included an interaction term in the model which 
was also not significant (b = 0.24, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.51], p = .080). This hypothesis therefore 
remains unsupported by the data. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, we compared the participants with and without a reported precognitive dream 
experience. This binary variable was derived from the precognitive dream frequency item. 
Those who selected the option ‘Never’ (N=33) were designated as ‘non-precognitive 
dreamers’ while the rest were considered ‘precognitive dreamers’ (N=17). An independent t-
test revealed no significant difference in the performance on the SRT task between non-
precognitive dreamers and precognitive dreamers, t(48) = 1.13, p = .265, r2 = .03. Hence, the 
hypothesis H4 about differences in SRT task performance was not supported. There was, 
however a significant difference between these groups in transliminality scores (mean 
difference = -3.19, 95% CI [-5.20, -1.18], t(48) = -3.19, p = .003, r2 = .17. This finding lends 
support to the hypothesis H5 about differences in transliminality between people with and 
without precognitive dream experience. 
2.3. Discussion 
Study 1 tested the hypothesis that people with precognitive dream belief and experience 
exhibit greater implicit learning than those without these beliefs and experiences. This 
hypothesis was not supported by the data. There was no statistically significant relationship 
between the performance on the SRT task and belief in precognitive dreams, nor a significant 
difference in the SRT task performance between participants who have had this kind of 
experience and those who have not. Moreover, this difference was in the opposite direction 
from the one predicted by the hypothesis. Our findings specifically concerning precognitive 
dream belief and experience and implicit learning are in line with an earlier study that found 
no relationship between general paranormal belief and performance on a different implicit 
sequence learning task (Palmer, Mohr, Krummenacher, & Brugger, 2007). 
Potential criticism of our findings could concern whether the learning exhibited by 
participants was really implicit. Previous research employing modifications of the SRT task 
in combination with the process dissociation procedure has shown that under some 
circumstances participants are able to discriminate between the test sequence used and 
random sequences at an above-chance level, although there was nevertheless evidence of 
implicit learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Bin, Dienes, Fu, & Gao, 2011). 
Therefore, there is a possibility of explicit learning contamination in the study. However, we 
echo Kaufman et al.’s (2010) argument that the probabilistic second order conditional version 
of the task employed in the present study makes explicit learning difficult, thus lowering this 
probability. 
It could also be argued in defence of the IPH that, although not better at implicit learning 
per se, precognitive dreamers are more sensitive to implicit pattern violation than those 
people who have not had precognitive dream experience. While we agree that this is indeed a 
possibility, we would posit that the above-reported analysis already tests this hypothesis by 
using the mean difference score as a measure of implicit learning. This index takes into 
account the difference between RT on improbable and probable trials and therefore the 
response latency on improbable trials compared to probable ones.3 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that this study tested merely one possible prediction 
of the IPH. It may be the case that the difference between precognitive and non-precognitive 
dreamers lies in the better ability of the latter group to notice subtle cues consciously. This 
would imply that although their implicit processing ability is not better, precognitive 
dreamers’ failure to notice these subtle cues explicitly might leave more opportunities for 
them to process them outside of awareness. To explore this a measure of implicit processing 
is required that would provide a means to clearly differentiate processing accompanied by 
awareness from processing in its absence. 
Study 1 also investigated the role of transliminality in implicit learning and precognitive 
dream belief and experience. Transliminality was positively related to both precognitive 
dream belief and experience. However, the significant relationship between transliminality 
and measure of implicit learning after controlling for precognitive dream belief was in the 
opposite direction to the one predicted. We find this result difficult to reconcile with that of 
Crawley et al. (2001) who found that high transliminality individuals performed better on a 
subliminal priming task than those low on transliminality as well as with our prediction 
which follows from the concept of transliminality itself. We can only speculate about the 
reasons for this contradiction. Perhaps the transliminality measure partly taps into some other 
variable that mediates the relationship between transliminality and susceptibility to 
subliminal priming. If believers in precognitive dreams happened to score higher on this 
unknown variable, it would explain the findings reported by Crawley et al. (2001), who did 
not control for precognitive dream/paranormal belief. If true, this would call into question the 
validity of transliminality as a unitary construct. Alternatively, the inconsistent nature of the 
findings obtained using transliminality scales could be caused by suboptimal psychometric 
characteristics of these measures. Although Lange, Houran, Thalbourne, and Storm (2000) 
claim that the revised transliminality scaled is a unidimensional measure, an additional 
principal component analysis of the data from the present sample revealed that the first 
principal component accounted merely for 26% of the total variance in the scores. Bartlett 
scores based on this principal component correlated with precognitive dream belief even 
more strongly than the Rasch scores used in the primary analysis (r = .498, 95% CI 
[.195, .745], p < .001). In order to account for over a half of the total variance of the RTS 
scores, a total of five components would need to be extracted. Furthermore, only four of the 
scale’s 17 items had communalities over .3 (items 3, 8, 16, and 18 with h2 = .53, .62, .56, 
and .53 respectively), while seven items had communalities below .1. It thus seems that, at 
least in the present sample, the Revised Transliminality Scale cannot be considered a valid 
measure. We encourage researchers working with this scale to pay closer attention to its 
psychometric characteristics in future studies. 
 
                                                
3 This argument is supported by the corroborative nature of the result obtained from an additional analysis of 
covariance that explored the differences in mean RT on improbable trial between the two groups while 
controlling for the mean RT on probable trials, F(1,47) = 1.27, p = .265. 
3. Study 2 
In the previous section, we outlined an alternative prediction of the implicit processing 
hypothesis of precognitive dream experience. We hypothesised that if these experiences 
really arise through the proposed mechanism, and if people without these experiences are 
better at noticing subtle cues explicitly, then non-precognitive dreamers are less likely to be 
influenced by this mechanism than precognitive dreamers, because precognitive dreamers are 
less able to consciously notice subtle cues. In other words, non-precognitive dreamers may 
have fewer precognitive dream experiences because they consciously notice subtle cues. 
In order to explore this prediction, Study 2 uses the flicker task, a well-established 
paradigm used in change blindness research. The term change blindness (Rensink, O’Regan 
& Clark, 1997) describes a phenomenon whereupon people fail to notice sometimes major 
changes in stimuli when the presentation of the stimuli is disrupted (for example by camera 
cuts) and the change occurs during this disruption. This phenomenon has been extensively 
studied and has proved to be highly robust and generalisable (c.f. Rensink, 2000; Simons, 
2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005). The flicker task developed by Rensink et al. (1997) and 
used in Study 2 involves presenting participants with stimuli in quick succession interrupted 
by a mask, usually a monochrome empty screen. The stimuli are two photographs, sometimes 
identical, sometimes with a single change to one of the pair. This task is appropriate for the 
purposes of the present study for several reasons. Firstly, as stated above, it is a widely-used 
research method in the field capable of creating a robust effect. Secondly, a modification of 
the flicker task described in the Methods section below offers means to distinguish conscious 
identification from implicit change detection and thus to assess them separately. It therefore 
appears appropriate for our purposes. Finally, the flicker task has previously been used in 
studies investigating implicit detection. In his study, Rensink (2004) asked participants to 
press a key when they feel a change has occurred and then again once they are able to 
identify the change explicitly. He found that some participants were able to ‘sense’ the 
change in the stimulus several seconds before they could identify it. In light of this finding, it 
is possible that the individual differences in the ability to ‘sense’ and ‘see’ the change might 
be related to precognitive dream experience. In this study, we therefore test the discussed 
prediction in terms of the change blindness paradigm, using a variation on the flicker task. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
As in Study 1, a planned number of mostly undergraduate student participants (N = 50, 26 
females) were recruited for the study and paid £6.20 each for their participation. Participants' 
ages ranged from 15 to 53 years (mean = 21.64, SD = 6.33). Data from one participant were 
omitted due to outlier values on the change detection measures. 
 
3.1.2. Material and apparatus 
Flicker task. In order to assess both explicit and implicit change detection, we used a 
modified version4 of the flicker paradigm used in change blindness research (Rensink, et al., 
1997). In this task, participants are presented with two pictures that oscillate in quick 
succession and asked to identify which element in the pictures undergoes change. In the 
present study, participants completed a total of 43 trials each, three practice trials and forty 
test trials. The stimuli, arranged in pairs, were all colour images with a resolution of 700x500 
                                                
4 We are grateful to Professor Richard Wiseman for suggesting this modification. 
pixels, displayed full-screen. The images used depicted everyday scenes (e.g., a picture of a 
train station) and were downloaded from Ronald Rensink’s personal website 
(http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~rensink/). The first image of the pair was shown for 240 ms, 
followed by a 120 ms mask (grey screen), after which the second image of the pair appeared 
for another 240 ms again followed by the mask. Each trial consisted of six such cycles, thus 
lasting 4.32 seconds. Fig. 3 shows a flowchart of a trial’s design. The pictures were identical 
(‘no-change trials’) in half of the test trials, while in the other half (‘change trials’), there was 
a single change, easily detectable under normal viewing conditions. The change to an object 
in the picture could be either in its presence (e.g., appearance and disappearance of a person) 
or in its location (e.g., horizon shifting up and down). The order of the trials was 
randomised.5 The task was designed using E-prime version 2.0 software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). All instructions were written in white font on black 
background. 
 
[INSERT FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Precognitive dream belief and experience. Participants’ belief in precognitive dreams 
was assessed using the same scale as in Study 1. This time, the reliability of the scale was 
high for all six items, ωt = .86; 95% CI [.76, .91]. The scale was again followed by an item 
inquiring into the frequency of participants’ precognitive dreams used to assess precognitive 
dream experience. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Data were collected in the Psychology Department of the University of Edinburgh. As in 
Study 1, participants were seated in an experimental cubicle in front of a computer with 
standard 16-inch CRT monitor with 75 Hz refresh rate. Participants were given an 
information sheet and a consent form, after which demographic data were collected. 
Next, participants completed the flicker task. They were asked to carefully read the 
instructions and informed that the first three trials would serve as practice trials. Subjects then 
proceeded, when ready, by pressing the space bar. Subsequently, a fixation cue in the form of 
a plus sign appeared in the centre of the screen for three seconds, after which the task began. 
After each trial, participants were prompted to indicate whether or not they detected a change 
by pressing the ‘y’ key for yes and the ‘n’ key for no. If they answered yes, they were asked 
to report verbally to the experimenter what the change was. If they did not see a change, they 
were prompted to decide based on their ‘gut feeling’ whether or not there was a change. The 
task terminated after three practice and forty test trials. Responses to the first prompt were 
labelled ‘explicit trials’ and responses to the gut feeling prompt were labelled ‘implicit trials’. 
Finally, they completed the precognitive dream belief and experience questionnaire 
presented using the Google forms service. After that, participants were debriefed, thanked for 
taking part in the study, paid, and dismissed. 
 
3.1.4. Hypotheses and analysis 
Study 2 explores the following hypotheses: 
                                                
5 Due to an error in the design, one trial was presented twice, which did not influence the total number of trials 
but, as a result, only 39 different test stimuli were presented. Both the duplicated and the omitted stimuli were 
‘no-change’ stimuli and therefore this error did not increase the likelihood of change detection. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between explicit performance on the flicker task and 
precognitive belief. 
H2: Participants without precognitive dream experience will perform better on the explicit 
flicker trials than those participants who have had such experience.  
As an additional test of the hypothesis investigated in Study 1, we formulated two further 
hypotheses: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between implicit performance on the flicker task and 
precognitive dream belief. 
H4: Precognitive dreamers perform better on implicit trials than non-precognitive 
dreamers. 
The flicker task was analysed using the d' and c indices as described in Stanislaw and 
Todorov (1999), used in signal detection analysis. The d' (d prime) index provides an 
estimate of sensitivity to signal versus noise, which, in the present case, translates to 
participants’ ability to detect change. It can theoretically range from -∞ to ∞ with 0 
representing chance performance. The c index is a measure of bias, i.e., a tendency to indicate 
the presence (liberal bias, c < 0) or absence (conservative bias, c > 0) of signal in situations of 
uncertainty. In our analysis, we calculated one set of indices for the explicit identification and 
one for implicit identification, based on participants’ ‘gut feeling’. Extreme values of hit rate 
and false alarm rate (0 and 1) were adjusted using the loglinear correction also described in 
Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). Furthermore, in implicit hit rates, this correction was 
multiplied by the ratio of implicit change trials to no-change trials in order to compensate for 
the bias caused by their unequal numbers. 
As in Study 1, unless stated otherwise, all reported p-values are two-tailed and all 
confidence intervals are based on a bootstrap sample of N = 2000. 
 
3.2. Results 
Table 3 summarises the descriptive statistics for the analysed variables. 
3.2.1. Flicker task item analysis 
We verified explicit hits by comparing participants’ verbal identifications to the stimuli. If 
participants scored an explicit hit but were unable to identify the element of change, the trial 
was relabelled a false alarm.6 
Furthermore, we explored the flicker task at the item level (individual stimuli used in 
trials) to identify potential ceiling and floor effects. We analysed both explicit and implicit hit 
rate on change items and correct rejection rates on implicit trials only. The rationale for this 
being that, in case of no-change trials, explicit ‘correct rejections’ can be expected to be high. 
Two change items scored a 100% explicit hit rate and were excluded from further analyses of 
explicit detection due to ceiling effect. One item scored a 0% hit rate and was also excluded 
due to floor effect. One further change trial was eliminated from implicit detection analysis 
due to floor effect, having never been implicitly detected. 
Finally, in order to assess possible effects of learning, we compared the hit rate on first 
half of the trials to that on the second half. If, during the course of the task, participants learnt 
what changes are most likely to occur, their explicit hit rates on the second half of the trials 
should be higher than their explicit hit rates on the first half. A paired sample t-test 
                                                
6 On top of the reported analysis, we also re-analysed the data with these trials scored as implicit hits to allow 
for the possibility that participants did indeed notice that something changed but could not make out what it was. 
This additional analysis was in agreement with the main analysis and the conclusions of the study. 
comparing these groups of hit rates was not significant (mean difference = -0.13, 95% CI [-
0.09, 0.06], t(49) = -0.335, p = .739). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis testing 
First, we explored the hypothesis H1 about a negative relationship between precognitive 
dream belief and explicit change detection. Two simple regression analyses conducted on 
measures of sensitivity and bias respectively, summarised in Table 4, did not reveal a 
significant relationship. 
Subsequently, in line with the hypothesis H2, we compared participants with (N = 18) and 
without (N = 31) precognitive dream experience on the explicit d' and c measures. 
Participants were divided into these groups by the same principle as in Study 1. Again the 
difference was non-significant for sensitivity, t(47) = 1.28, p = .256, r2 = .03, or bias, t(47) 
= .11, p = .917, r2 = 2.57 x 10-4. The results of this analysis do not lend support to the tested 
hypotheses. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to assess the hypothesised differences in implicit change detection, we first 
explored participants’ overall performance on implicit trials. The mean sensitivity on these 
trials was 0.35 (SD = 0.61) which indicates an above-chance performance. This value 
differed significantly from zero, t(48) = 4.00, p < .001, 95% CI [0.17, 0.51], r2 = .25, 
suggesting that participants were able to detect a change even when they reported not having 
seen it.  
Another set of simple regression analyses was conducted in order to investigate the 
hypothesised relationship between precognitive dream belief and measures of sensitivity and 
bias on implicit trials (H3), however no significant relationship was discovered. The findings 
are summarised in Table 5. Controlling for sensitivity on explicit trials did not change the 
null result; the effect of implicit d' was still not significant, b = -1.41, SE = 1.40, β = -0.15, p 
= .318, 95% CI of b [-4.14, 2.26]. 
Again, these findings are corroborated by comparing the implicit performance of 
precognitive dreamers and non-precognitive dreamers, as stated in the hypothesis H4. There 
was no significant difference between these groups on sensitivity, t(47) = 0.84, p = .452, r2 
= .01, or bias, t(47) = 1.24, p = .237 r2 = .03. Thus, the hypotheses about a relationship 
between implicit change detection and precognitive dream belief and experience were not 
supported by the data. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
3.3. Discussion 
Study 2 focused on the role of explicit and implicit change detection in precognitive dream 
belief as well as differences in these variables between people with and without precognitive 
dream experience. We hypothesised a negative relationship between explicit change detection 
and precognitive dream belief and a positive one between implicit detection and this belief. 
Furthermore we predicted differences in explicit and implicit change detection between 
precognitive and non-precognitive dreamers. None of the hypotheses were supported by the 
data. In contrast to a previous study investigating paranormal belief using signal detection 
methods (Krummenacher, Mohr, Haker, & Brugger, 2010), we did not find that paranormal 
believers exhibited a lower response criterion (i.e., favoured false alarms over misses). 
It could be argued that the employed task did not in fact measure implicit detection. 
Indeed, this line of argumentation has been raised in a critique of Rensink’s (2004) study by 
Simons, Nevarez, and Boot (2005). They argued, in terms of signal detection theory, that 
when participants indicate they sensed a change, they are merely expressing that they have 
evidence of change but that this evidence has not yet reached the decision criterion. In other 
words, the ‘sensing’ detections represented merely liberal responses waiting to be confirmed. 
If this criticism applies to the present study, one would expect to find the participants 
exhibiting liberal bias in their performance on implicit trials. However, in the present study, 
participants tended to adopt a somewhat conservative bias for both explicit and implicit trials. 
Furthermore, Simons et al. (2005) show that participants in the ‘can-sense’ category (those 
who ‘sensed’ the change substantially sooner than they ‘saw’ it) made more false alarms than 
‘only-see’ participants. In our study, however, the mean sensitivity to change on implicit 
trials was significantly higher than chance-level, which would not occur had false alarms 
been proportional to hits. 
Granted the argument above, one could nevertheless suggest that the hits and correct 
rejections on implicit trials represented situations when the phenomenon of change was 
detected consciously but the particular element that changed was not. This argument would 
imply that participants first use some kind of global perception to assess the overall state of 
the stimuli and only then use a more analytical approach to identify the changing element. 
While this idea seems plausible at least at face value, we would suggest that a potential 
proponent of this explanation needs to provide an explanation of what it means to notice 
something without knowing what it is, as well as account for why participants indicated that 
they had not noticed a change. 
4. General discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the hypothesis that putative precognitive dream experiences 
are caused by implicit processing of subtle environmental cues. Study 1 explored the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between transliminality, implicit learning ability, and 
precognitive dream belief and experience. None of the predictions were confirmed by the 
data analysis. Furthermore, we found a negative relationship between transliminality scores 
and performance on the SRT task. Study 2 focused on the relationship between implicit and 
explicit change detection ability on one hand and precognitive dream belief and experience 
on the other. We hypothesised that belief and experience of precognitive dreams would be 
negatively related to explicit change detection. Neither of these hypotheses was supported by 
the data. In light of these two studies, we conclude that precognitive dream experience is not 
explained by individual differences in explicit and implicit processing abilities, such as the 
ones assessed by the reported studies. 
Some remarks on the limitations of the reported studies are in order. Firstly, there is an on-
going discussion in the scientific community about whether or not the methods employed in 
these studies have demonstrated the existence of true implicit processing in the absence of 
awareness (c.f. Mitroff, Simons, & Franconeri, 2002; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). If 
we adopt the negative stance on this debate, there are two possible implications; either this 
kind of higher processing cannot take place without being accompanied by awareness or it 
can take place but there are currently no good methods of assessing it. In case of the latter, 
further development in this field is needed before the IPH can be reliably tested. However, if 
there is indeed no such thing as implicit processing, the hypothesis in question becomes false 
by definition. 
Secondly, it could be argued that more emotionally impactful stimuli than those used in 
the present studies are needed in order for the implicit mechanisms leading to precognitive 
dreams to take effect. Returning to the hypothetical example in the introduction, anxiety 
resulting from unrealised concern for one’s relative’s health certainly bears more personal 
relevance than a sequence of characters on a computer screen, however, the aim of this paper 
was to examine the variability of general implicit processing ability, not of implicit 
processing of emotionally upsetting stimuli. The point is nevertheless valid and we would 
encourage future research on this topic. 
Furthermore, the sample sizes used in our studies might not have been large enough to 
detect the true effects. There were only 17 precognitive dreamers (34%) in Study 1 and 18 
(37%) in Study 2, which might not have been sufficient numbers for the conducted 
comparisons. We might have obtained a higher proportion of precognitive dreamers had we 
used a sample with a cultural background that particularly endorsed such experiences. Our 
sample consisted mostly of white, UK-domiciled undergraduate psychology students, 
however the proportion of precognitive dreamers that we obtained with this sample is in line 
with that found in most representative surveys of paranormal beliefs. 
Finally, there are at least two possible predictions of the IPH that were not explored by our 
studies. Firstly, it may be that precognitive dream experiences are not explained by individual 
differences in waking life implicit processing, but by differences in the extent to which this 
processed information manifests itself in the individual’s dream imagery. A study exploring 
this hypothesis could, for instance, assess the relationship of precognitive dream experience 
and sleep-inspired insight. Secondly, it could be argued that most people have dreams that, to 
some extent, reflect unconscious inferences about implicitly processed information and that 
whether or not these are deemed precognitive depends largely on external circumstances and 
subjective assessment. Some people might be more inclined to attribute precognitive 
character to such dreams, others might look for other, less extraordinary explanations. Thus, 
while fully embracing any efforts to replicate our findings and to find alternative means of 
testing the implicit processing hypothesis, we would also like to encourage research into 
potential mechanisms leading to differences in precognitive dream attribution. 
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